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Unpatriotic Profit: How For-Profit Colleges  
Target Veterans and What the Government 
Must Do  
to Stop Them 
 
Christopher J. Salemme 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Veterans in the United States today are easy prey for 
corporations looking to make a profit from federal government 
funds intended to help these veterans become educated and 
gainfully employed in the private sector. For-profit educational 
institutions promise career advancement, practical technical 
skills, and easy online access to their programs. Yet a veteran 
like Mark Glogouski, who enrolled in the for-profit Colorado 
Technical University1 in 2011, remains in his original job as an 
aircraft painter, but with “two associates’ degrees that aren’t in 
the field [he] wanted, an unfinished bachelor’s degree, no more 
veteran benefits and $65,000 in federal student loan debt.”2 
When Corinthian Colleges went out of business following a 
U.S. Department of Education investigation into its deceptive 
advertising practices,3 Marine Corps veteran and Corinthian 
 
 1.  Colorado Technical University markets itself as a “military-friendly university” and 
provides “Military Education Benefits Specialists . . . to help [service members] navigate [their] 
education benefits and financial aid.” Military-Friendly Online College, COLO. TECH. UNIV., 
http://www.coloradotech.edu/military (last visited June 20, 2017). 
 2.  David Olinger, Veterans Feel Ripped Off by Colorado For-Profit College, COLO. 
INDEP. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/163650/veterans-colorado-tech-
for-profit-college-debt. 
 3.  “Following enforcement actions by the federal government and other authorities, 
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., sold most of its schools and later closed the remaining ones.” 
Information About Debt Relief for Corinthian Colleges Students, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/announcements/Corinthian (last visited June 20, 2017). 
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student Paul Fajardo’s GI Bill housing benefits were revoked, 
forcing him to live out of his car.4 Navy veteran Robert 
Velasquez was enrolled at the Retail Ready Career Center in 
Garland, Texas, until it abruptly shut down in September 
2017.5 Velasquez now “question[s] why [he] believed the 
school’s aggressive sales pitch to him that sounded ‘too good to 
be true.’”6 
Considered the finest fighting force in world history, the 
Armed Forces of the United States of America credits its 
success “not [to] tanks, planes or ships, [but to its] People. . . . 
They are your sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, 
husbands and wives. People of whom we are very proud. These 
are the best of America.”7 The value of the American men and 
women who selflessly serve their nation is unparalleled; 
however, the protections afforded to veterans by the federal 
government are not always sufficient to meet the injustices they 
face in the civilian world. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that 
began early in the twenty-first century are far less active than 
they were a few years ago.8 Today, there are approximately 
11,000 American service members in Afghanistan, down from 
100,000 in 2010, and 5,765 service members in Iraq, down 
from 170,000 in 2007.9 Thus, veterans seeking post-military 
 
 4.  Chris Kirkham & Alan Zarembo, For-Profit Colleges Are Using the GI Bill to 
Make Money Off Veterans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-for-profit-colleges-gi-bill-20150809-story.html. 
 5.  Eva-Marie Ayala, Hundreds of Veterans Scramble After Garland For-Profit College 
Closes, DALLAS NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2017/09/
28/hundreds-veterans-scramble-garland-profit-college-closes. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Our Most Important Resource, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.defense.gov/About-DoD/DoD-101#Our%20Most%2 0Important%20Rescource 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 8.  Helene Cooper, U.S. to Send 600 More Troops to Iraq to Help Retake Mosul from 
ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/middleeast/oba
ma-troops-iraq.html; Greg Jaffe & Missy Ryan, Obama Outlines Plan to Keep 5,500 Troops in 
Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na
tional-security/obama-expected-to-announce-new-plan-to-keep-5500-troops-in-
afghanistan/2015/10/14/d98f06fa-71d3-11e5-8d93-
0af317ed58c9_story.html?utm_term=.99879b327685. 
 9.  Ryan Browne, Pentagon Revises Number of Troops in Afghanistan, Disclosing 
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employment are also seeking educational opportunities to 
better qualify them for civilian jobs.10 
The private sector has taken note. For-profit 
educational institutions saw a significant increase in veteran 
enrollment between 2009 and 2013, while their civilian 
enrollment declined.11 In 2014, one notable for-profit college 
company, University of Phoenix, received $345 million in 
federal educational funds for veterans as it enrolled 
approximately 50,000 veterans from the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.12 Veterans are heavily—and often unscrupulously—
recruited by for-profit institutions (“FPIs”) because education 
benefits provided to veterans under existing law do not qualify 
as standard, Department of Education-administered, federal 
educational assistance programs, and therefore the revenue that 
can be generated from veterans is unlimited.13 This article 
explores the for-profit education industry, its history of 
deceitful recruitment of veterans, the federal government’s 
attempts at reform, and what steps need to be taken by the 
Trump administration and Congress to protect veterans and 
taxpayer dollars from private industry exploitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
2,600 More, CNN (Aug. 30, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/30/politics/us-
revises-number-troops-afghanistan/index.html; Mark Thompson, Number of U.S. Troops in 
Iraq Keeps Creeping Upward, TIME (Apr. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4298318/iraq-us-
troops-barack-obama-mosul-isis/. 
 10.  See Eric Westervelt, For-Profit Colleges Seeking Veterans’ GI Bill Dollars Aren’t 
Always the Best Fit, NPR: NPRED (Jan. 29, 2016, 7:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2
016/01/29/464579497/veterans-to-higher-ed-big-room-for-improvement. 
 11.  Elizabeth Jones, New Report Shows Nearly $2 Billion in GI Bill Funds Go to For-
Profit Colleges, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 30, 2014, 5:11 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/new-report-shows-nearly-2-billion-of-gi-bill-funds-
go-to-for-profit-colleges. 
 12.  Aaron Glantz, University of Phoenix Sidesteps Obama Order on Recruiting 
Veterans, REVEAL (June 30, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/university-of-phoenix-
sidesteps-obama-order-on-recruiting-veterans/. 
 13.  See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text. 
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II.  FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION 
 
A. Higher Education Systems in the United States 
 
Higher education institutions in the United States can 
be broken down into three economic categories: public, non-
profit, and for-profit. Public universities, as their name 
indicates, are generally owned and operated by state 
governments who charge their state residents lower tuition than 
out-of-state residents. Some of these universities date back to 
the eighteenth century, with Georgia being the first state to 
charter a university in 1785,14 followed by the chartering of the 
University of North Carolina in 1789.15 Non-profit universities 
in the United States predate public universities, and even the 
independence and establishment of the nation.16 Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code defines the non-profit 
status, and therefore tax exempt status, of these privately owned 
institutions as corporations that are “organized and operated 
exclusively for . . . educational purposes.”17 The Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) further requires of these entities that: 
[N]o part of the net earnings . . . inures to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, 
no substantial part of the activities of which is 
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, 
to influence legislation . . . and which does not 
participate in, or intervene in  . . . any political 
 
 14.  History of UGA, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA. (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.uga.edu/profile/history/. 
 15.  First Public University in the United States, THE CAROLINA STORY: A VIRTUAL 
MUSEUM U. HIST., https://museum.unc.edu/exhibits/show/davie/silhouette1820 (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2016). 
 16.  See About Harvard, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, http://www.harvard.edu/about-
harvard (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (“Established in 1636, Harvard is the oldest institution of 
higher education in the United States.”). 
 17.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
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campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.18 
 
Although many non-profit private universities generate 
millions of dollars in revenue annually19 and some have multi-
billion-dollar endowments,20 they are in accordance with 
section 501(c)(3) so long as they operate with an educational, 
rather than profit-driven, purpose.  
However, the third category of higher education 
institutions do have a profit-based purpose and do not qualify 
for tax-exempt status with the IRS. These institutions may 
operate entirely online, as traditional campus-based 
universities, or a hybrid of the two.21 They distinguish 
themselves from non-profit universities by treating their 
students as customers and operating on a business model with 
financial growth as their primary goal.22 Frequently criticized 
by academics23 and government agencies,24 FPIs are still able to 
 
   18.  Id. 
19.    See, e.g., NW. UNIV., 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.northwester
n.edu/financial-operations/annual-financial-reports/2013-Financial-Report.pdf (In FY 2013, 
Northwestern University’s “[t]otal assets grew to $10.9 billion, an increase of more than 
$1 billion from the 
previous year.”); VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, 2015 FINANCIAL REPORT 5 (2015), https://financ
e.vanderbilt.edu/report/FY2015-FinancialReport.pdf (noting that in FY 2015, “the university’s 
total net assets increased $132 million to [$5.975 billion]”). 
 20.  Katherine N. Lapp & Paul J. Finnegan, Financial Overview from the Executive Vice 
President and the Treasurer, in HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 
2014, at 3, 3 (Nov. 7, 
2014), http://finance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files/har_fy14_financialreport.pdf (Harvard’s endow
me-nt after FY 2014 amounted to $36.4 billion). 
 21.  See RICHARD L. ALFRED, MANAGING THE BIG PICTURE IN COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES: FROM TACTICS TO STRATEGY 189 (2006). 
 22.  Id. at 189–90; JAMES COLEMAN & RICHARD VEDDER, CTR. FOR COLLEGE 
AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY, FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PRIMER 11 (May 2008). 
 23.  See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the For-
Profit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515 (2012); Menesha Mannapperuma, 
Protecting Students, Protecting Consumers: A New Federal Regulation of the For-Profit 
Distance Learning Industry, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 541 (2015). 
 24.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND 
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT]. 
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maintain profitability by selling themselves as career-oriented 
and a cost-effective means for students to learn practical job 
skills.25 While the continued growth of the Internet and online 
education has resulted in the increased prevalence of for-profit 
education, the concept dates back centuries.26 In the United 
States, FPIs saw significant growth during the nineteenth 
century, especially in the business education sector.27 
 
B. For-Profit Education Today 
 
By 2005, over one million students in the United States 
were enrolled in FPIs, with an average annual growth rate of 
eleven percent since 1976.28 Larger umbrella corporations, such 
as Education Management Corporation, often own and operate 
these schools as subsidiaries like a company would in any other 
market.29 The internet has allowed for the rapid growth of FPIs 
as students can enroll and take classes from anywhere in the 
world and there are no physical enrollment limits that a 
traditional classroom would have. Two of the largest FPIs, 
DeVry University30 and University of Phoenix,31 offer classes in 
dozens of degree programs online and on campuses across the 
United States.32 
With a profit-driven objective, FPIs are forced to 
competitively price their programs. They earn far less revenue 
per student than traditional, non-profit public and private 
 
 25.  ALFRED, supra note 21. 
 26.  COLEMAN & VEDDER, supra note 22, at 5. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 6 Figures 1, 9. 
 29.  See About Us, EDUC. MGMT. CORP., http://www.edmc.edu/About/ (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2016).  
 30.  See Our Heritage, DEVRY UNIVERSITY, http://www.devry.edu/community-
network/our-heritage.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
 31.  See UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, CONSUMER INFO. GUIDE 2017–2018, at 1–3 
(2017), http://www.phoenix.edu/content/dam/altcloud/doc/about_uopx/Consumer-
Information-Guide.pdf 
 32.  UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, supra note 31; Our Heritage, supra note 30. 
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universities, and receive on average only five dollars per student 
in government support, whereas nonprofits receive on average 
over seven thousand dollars per student.33 Therefore, FPIs must 
also balance their fiscally competitive edge with the necessity of 
earning a profit. Ninety percent of their revenue is generated 
by student fees, meaning that without donors or substantial 
government assistance, they must reduce expenses to maintain 
profitability.34 
Recruiting students and maintaining low costs has led 
FPIs to aggressively market their product as an affordable, 
career-driven, and legitimate alternative to traditional 
institutions. In 2010, and in light of billions of dollars in federal 
loans being spent at FPIs annually, the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted an investigation into 
the marketing practices of fifteen FPIs.35 Investigators 
presented themselves as prospective students seeking to enroll 
in one of several different types of degree programs offered by 
the schools.36 Of the fifteen FPIs, four encouraged the 
undercover investigators to falsify federal student aid 
documentation in order to receive federal benefits.37 For 
example, in direct violation of reporting requirements for 
federal aid, “[a] financial aid officer at a privately owned college 
in Texas told [a GAO] undercover applicant not to report 
$250,000 in savings, stating that it was not the government’s 
business how much money the undercover applicant had in a 
bank account.”38 
Additionally, FPIs have been defendants in at least 
twenty lawsuits under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).39 The 
FCA creates civil liability for any person who knowingly makes 
 
 33.  COLEMAN & VEDDER, supra note 22, at 11. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  GAO REPORT, supra note 24. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 7. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Cooley, supra note 23, at 534. 
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“a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or “a false 
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”40 in 
an effort to defraud the federal government.41 Barring 
mitigating circumstances for reduced liability,42 defendants are 
subject to a civil penalty of up to three times the damages 
sustained by the government plus five to ten thousand dollars.43 
Actions under the FCA may only be brought by the United 
States Department of Justice, or by a private person, state, or 
local government (possibly as a co-plaintiff with the 
Department of Justice) in a Qui Tam action.44 
In one example of an FCA action being brought against 
an FPI, the University of Phoenix was alleged to have violated 
the federal ban45 on incentive compensation for recruiters by 
making “false promises to comply with the incentive 
compensation ban in order to become eligible to receive Title 
IV funds.”46 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California originally granted the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.47 However, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the 
plaintiffs properly alleged the elements of liability under the 
False Claims Act: “(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of 
conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing 
(4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due. 
The question remaining is whether relators in this case have 
alleged facts satisfying all four of these elements.”48 
 
 40.  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a) (2012). 
 41.  See id. § 3729(b). 
 42.  See id. § 3729(a)(2). 
 43.  Id. § 3729(a)(1)(g). 
 44.  Id. § 3730. 
 45.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (20) (“The institution will not provide any commission, 
bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on success in securing 
enrollments or financial aid to any persons or entities engaged in any student recruiting or 
admission activities or in making decisions regarding the award of student financial assistance. . 
. .”). 
 46.  United States v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 47.  See id. at 1168. 
 48.  Id. at 1174, 1177–78. 
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The for-profit education industry has further been 
accused of exploiting veterans in especially egregious ways: 
[S]ome institutions have recruited veterans with 
serious brain injuries and emotional 
vulnerabilities without providing academic 
support and counseling; encouraged service 
members and veterans to take out costly 
institutional loans rather than encouraging them 
to apply for Federal student loans first; engaged 
in misleading recruiting practices on military 
installations; and failed to disclose meaningful 
information that allows potential students to 
determine whether the institution has a good 
record of graduating service members, veterans, 
and their families and posi-tioning them for 
success in the workforce.49 
 
In a prime example of how dedicated FPIs are to luring 
veterans to their programs, the University of Phoenix was 
recently found to be distributing commemorative coins with 
the University logo on one side and the insignias of each 
branch of the armed forces on the other on military 
installations.50 Challenge coins, as these coins are often called in 
military culture, are “a form of recognition of the hard work 
and excellence an individual has displayed” and are usually 
distributed by unit commanders or senior non-commissioned 
officers.51 In using official military insignias with the 
institution’s logo as a marketing tool, University of Phoenix not 
only showed disrespect for the military tradition of challenge 
 
 49.  Exec. Order No. 13607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,861 (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 50.  Dan Sagalyn, Pentagon Puts For-Profit University of Phoenix on Probation, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 9, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/pentagon-puts-
profit-university-phoenix-probation/. 
 51.  Cf. Deana Heitzman, 31st Fighter Wing Pub. Affairs, Challenge Coins: A Tradition 
of Excellence, U.S.A.F. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Arti
cle/ 584692/challenge-coins-a-tradition-of-excellence.aspx. 
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coins, but was also found to be in violation of Department of 
Defense policy and was subsequently put on “probation.”52 
However, the Department of Defense does allow the 
University of Phoenix to advertise its programs on military 
installations with permission and at a cost.53 At Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky, the corporation paid $250,000 over three years to 
sponsor eighty-nine events.54 
 
III. VETERANS’ EDUCATION BENEFITS 
 
Educational financial assistance for veterans and their 
families is primarily administered by the United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs through several programs, for 
which eligibility is generally dependent on when the veteran 
served and for how long. Of these programs, the largest in 
effect today are the Veterans’ Educational Assistance 
Program,55 (“VEAP”), the All-Volunteer Force Educational 
Assistance Program,56 (“Montgomery GI Bill”), and the Post-
9/11 Educational Assistance Program,57 (“Post-9/11 GI 
Bill”).58 Enacted in 1976, VEAP provides educational assistance 
to service members who enlisted between December 31, 1976, 
and July 1, 1985.59 The program aimed “to assist young men 
and women in obtaining an education they might not otherwise 
be able to afford” while also encouraging future enlistment.60 At 
the conclusion of VEAP’s eligibility window, Congress enacted 
 
 52.  Sagalyn, supra note 50. 
 53.  Aaron Glantz, University of Phoenix Gained Special Access to Military Base—For a 
Price, REVEAL (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/blog/university-of-phoenix-gained-
special-access-to-military-base-for-a-price/. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  38 U.S.C. §§ 3201–3243 (2012). 
 56.  Id. §§ 3001–3036. 
 57.  38 C.F.R. pt. 21, subpt. P (2009). 
 58.  See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL 857 (Barton F. Stichman, Ronald B. Abrams & 
Louis J. George eds., 2014 ed. 2014). 
 59.  38 U.S.C. § 3201 (2012). 
 60.  Id. 
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the Montgomery GI Bill to continue providing service 
members with educational assistance to ease their transition to 
civilian life and allow them to take advantage of higher-
education opportunities they otherwise might not be able to 
afford.61 Those eligible under the GI Bill must have begun their 
service after June 30, 1995, and must have served at least two 
years on active duty status.62 The most-recently enacted 
program is the Post-9/11 GI Bill—a program for veterans who 
served at least thirty-six months on active duty and began their 
service on or after September 11, 2001.63 
Educational assistance programs for veterans, while 
complex in nature, are vast and apply to many different 
educational opportunities veterans may seek. The Post-9/11 GI 
Bill, for example, offers tuition assistance that starts at covering 
forty percent of expenses for veterans who, after September 11, 
2001, served between ninety days and six months on active 
duty, and up to one hundred percent of expenses for veterans 
who served at least thirty-six months on active duty or were 
discharged for a service-related disability after serving at least 
thirty continuous days.64 
 
IV.  THE 90/10 RULE 
 
A. The Rule 
 
Through empty promises of strong career prospects 
after completion of their programs, FPIs recruit veterans in 
astonishing numbers.65 DeVry University, for example, 
“advertise[d] that 90 percent of its graduates seeking 
 
 61.  38 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
 62.  Montgomery GI Bill Active Duty (MGIB-AD), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, https://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/mgib_ad.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 63.  38 U.S.C. § 3311(b) (2012). 
 64.  DEP’T OF VET. AFFAIRS, POST-9/11 GI BILL: IT’S YOUR FUTURE (May 2012), 
http://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/docs/pamphlets/ch33_pamphlet.pdf. 
 65.  See Westervelt, supra note 10. 
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employment found jobs in their field within six months of 
graduation.”66 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed 
suit against DeVry for this allegedly deceptive advertisement, 
and also for its claim “that its graduates had 15 percent higher 
incomes one year after graduation on average than the 
graduates of all other colleges or universities.”67 A settlement 
agreement between the FTC and DeVry was reached in 
December 2016 in which DeVry agreed to “pay $49.4 million 
in cash to be distributed to qualifying students who were 
harmed by the deceptive ads, as well as $50.6 million in debt 
relief.”68 
Of course, with the veterans recruited by FPIs comes 
revenue from federal educational assistance programs like the 
GI Bill, and in fiscal year 2012–2013, twenty-five percent of GI 
Bill funds were paid to just eight FPIs69 and totaled $1.7 billion 
just from Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits.70 FPIs recruit veterans so 
heavily, in part, because of what has become known as the 
“90/10 Rule.”71 This rule, established in an amendment to the 
Higher Education Act in 2008, requires that FPIs “derive not 
less than ten percent of such institution’s revenues from sources 
 
 66.  Merrit Kennedy, For-Profit DeVry University Is Sued Over Employment Figure 
Claims, NPR (Jan. 27, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/01/27/464599226/for-profit-devry-university-is-sued-over-employment-figure-
claims. 
 67.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Brings Enforcement Action Against 
DeVry University (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/ftc-
brings-enforcement-action-against-devry-university; see also Complaint for Permanent 
Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. DeVry Educ. Grp. Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00579-
MWF-SS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016). 
 68.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, DeVry University Agrees to $100 Million 
Settlement with FTC (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2016/12/devry-university-agrees-100-million-settlement-ftc; see also Stipulated Order 
for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, FTC v. DeVry Educ. Grp. Inc., No. 2:16-
cv-00579-MWF-SS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (imposing additional advertising, training, and 
reporting requirements on DeVry). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Jones, supra note 11. 
 71.  See Jaclyn Patton, Comment, Encouraging Exploitation of the Military by For-
Profit Colleges: The New GI Bill and the 90/10 Rule, 54 S. Tex. L. Rev. 425, 426 (2012). 
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other than funds provided under [Title 20].”72 Therefore, no 
more than ninety percent of an FPI’s revenue may come from 
traditional federal education assistance programs.73 
Veterans educational assistance programs do not fall 
under Title 20 of the United States Code, however.74 After an 
FPI’s revenue reaches that ninety percent threshold, it can still 
take advantage of federal money through the recruitment of 
veterans to fill that remaining ten percent.75 
 
 
 
B. Initiatives 
 
The deceptive and ill-willed tactics of the for-profit 
education industry have not gone unnoticed. In 2012, President 
Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13607 “in order to 
ensure that Federal military and veterans educational benefits 
programs are providing service members, veterans, spouses, and 
other family members with the information, support, and 
protections they deserve.”76 The Order required the formation 
of “Principles of Excellence”— a series of standards for 
educational institutions receiving funds through veteran 
assistance programs that would provide additional oversight of 
FPIs’ recruitment and enrollment of veterans.77 Specifically, the 
Principles of Excellence were intended to ensure veterans are 
provided with the necessary information related to the 
educational programs, end the inappropriate recruitment 
efforts by FPIs on military installations, and end deceptive 
online marketing targeted at veterans and service members.78 
 
 72.  20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (24) (2012). 
 73.  See id.; Patton, supra note 71. 
 74.  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1094; 38 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3036, 3201–3243, 3311. 
 75.  See Westervelt, supra note 10. 
 76.  Exec. Order No. 13607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,861 (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 77.  Id. at 25, 861–25, 862. 
 78.  Id.; Press Release, The White House, We Can’t Wait: President Obama Takes 
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These new standards require FPIs to do the following: 
(1) use a “standardized form . . . to help those prospective 
students understand the total cost of the educational program” 
and how much would be covered by military and veteran 
programs; (2) “end fraudulent and unduly aggressive recruiting 
techniques on and off military installations, as well as 
misrepresentation, payment of incentive compensation, and 
failure to meet State authorization requirements;” (3) readmit 
active and reserve service members who are forced to take a 
leave of absence from their education to perform service 
obligations; (4) refund tuition to students who withdraw before 
the completion of their course of study; (5) ensure that service 
members and veterans using federal funds for the educational 
program understand the program’s completion requirements; 
and (6) “designate a point of contact for academic and financial 
advising (including access to disability counseling) to assist 
service member and veteran students and their families with the 
successful completion of their studies and with their job 
searches.”79 
The Principles, delegated to the Secretaries of 
Education, Veterans Affairs, and Defense for implementation, 
also delegated enforcement authority to those secretaries and 
their respective departments.80 A centralized system was thus 
formed where veterans can file complaints about educational 
institutions which may have violated federal laws or 
regulations.81 Complaints thought to have a well-founded basis 
are then referred to the Department of Justice for civil or 
criminal enforcement against the suspect institutions.82 To 
 
Action to Stop Deceptive and Misleading Practices by Educational Institutions that Target 
Veterans, Service 
Members and Their Families (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/04/26/we-can-t-wait-president-obama-takes-action-stop-deceptive-and-misleading. 
 79.  Exec. Order No. 13607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25, 862 (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 80.  Id. at 25,863. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
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combat the incidences of FPIs illegally recruiting service 
members on military installations, the Order requires the 
Department of Defense to issue new rules pertaining to access 
of military installations, and to require that only those 
institutions that enter into a memorandum of agreement with 
the Department of Defense will be permitted such access.83 
Also in furtherance of President Obama’s Principles of 
Excellence, the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Education, 
and Defense collaboratively launched the GI Bill Feedback 
System.84 Complaints received under the GI Bill Feedback 
System are categorized as either serious or flagrant, or as not 
being related to the Principles of Excellence.85 The latter 
category is for complaints that “focus[] on VA’s handling of 
education benefits, [do] not involve the institution or employer, 
[are] incoherent or spam,” or if the “[c]omplaint is a duplicate 
of another.”86 Serious or flagrant complaints include 
accusations of “serious or significant fraud or abuse,” are 
“[s]ubmitted by a whistleblower,” or are otherwise determined 
to be serious by department staff.87 In less than one year after 
the program began, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
received 2,254 complaints, of which 1,434 were based on the 
Principles of Excellence.88 These complaints led to forty-two 
“targeted risk-based program reviews,” and as a result, two 
federally-approved education programs were disqualified.89 
 
C. Pushback from FPIs 
 
 
 83.  Id. at 25, 864; see supra footnotes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 84.  VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., GI BILL FEEDBACK SYSTEM 1 (January 2015), 
https://www.benefits.va.gov/GIBILL/docs/Overview_GI%20Bill_Feedback%20System_CY14.
pdf. 
 85.  Id. at 3. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 1. 
 89.  Id. 
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With the new regulations in place, the federal 
government has met opposition from the for-profit education 
industry, especially in its lobbying arm Career Education 
Colleges and Universities (“CECU”), formerly known as the 
Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities 
(“APSCU”).90 CECU represents five hundred member schools 
that claim to pride themselves in providing “skills-based 
education opportunities to nontraditional students, particularly 
veterans, working mothers, and parents.”91 In 2014, APSCU 
filed a three-count, seventy-seven-page complaint against 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, the Department of 
Education, and the federal government as a whole.92 The 
lawsuit was in response to the Department of Education’s 
promulgation of the Gainful Employment Rule.93 The rule 
“establish[ed] measures for determining whether certain 
postsecondary educational programs prepare students for 
gainful employment in a recognized occupation, and the 
conditions under which these educational programs remain 
eligible under the Federal Student Aid programs authorized 
under Title IV of the HEA (Title IV, HEA programs).”94 
During the public comment period for the rule, “[o]ne 
commenter expressed support on the basis that, by preventing 
students from enrolling in low-performing programs, the 
regulations would curb predatory recruiting practices that 
target veterans in particular,”95 and others expressed support 
 
 90.  See CAREER EDUC. COLLS. & UNIVS., http://www.career.org/ (last visited Nov. 28, 
2016); infra notes 85–102 and accompanying text; see also Complaint & Prayer for Declaratory 
& Injunctive Relief, Cal. Ass’n of Private Postsecondary Sch. v. DeVos, No. 1:17-cv-00999 
(D.D.C. filed May 24, 2017). 
 91.  About Us, CAREER EDUC. COLLS. & UNIVS., http://www.career.org/about.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2017). 
 92.  See Complaint, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 
176 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01870-JDB). 
 93.  Id. at 2; see Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,890 (Oct. 31, 
2014) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 600, 668). 
 94.  Gainful Employment, supra note 93, at 64, 890. 
 95.  Id. at 64, 896. 
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based on the for-profit education industry’s high reliance on 
veterans’ educational assistance programs compared to their 
non-profit counterparts.96 
APSCU, on behalf of its 1,400 member institutions, 
argued that the rule was a violation of the First Amendment,97 
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965,98 and the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)99 because it was 
“unlawful, arbitrary, and irrational, and [would] needlessly 
harm millions of students who attend private sector colleges 
and universities.”100 According to the plaintiff, the Department 
of Education unscrupulously “rel[ied] primarily on error-
ridden, partisan, and discredited sources” and “pursued the 
proposed regulations with the singular premise of ‘cut[ting] 
[for-profits] out . . . of federal aid.’”101 They further contended 
that the enabling legislation for the rule “requires only that 
programs prepare student for employment that is gainful . . . 
not that the students actually secure employment at certain 
income levels relative to various measures of student debt.”102 
Because it believed the rule not only exceeded the 
Department’s rulemaking authority, but was also arbitrary and 
capricious and violated its “members’ right to free speech by 
compelling them to speak in an unduly burdensome manner,” 
APSCU sought the District Court for the District of Columbia 
to declare the rule unlawful, postpone its effective date, and 
award plaintiffs’ costs and attorneys’ fees.103 
In its motion for summary judgment, the government 
argued that the Department “promulgated thoughtful 
 
 96.  Id. at 64,903. 
 97.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 98.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099d (2012). 
 99.  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012). 
 100.  Complaint, supra note 92, at 2, 75–76. 
 101.  Id. at 4 (quoting Roberto J. Rodriguez, Conference of Student Loans: Opening 
Plenary Session (Oct. 24, 2013)). 
 102.  Id. at 5. 
 103.  Id. at 75–76. 
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regulations, aimed at a vexing problem in its area of expertise, 
that demonstrate reasoned decision-making.”104 The United 
States Supreme Court discussed the standard of review for an 
agency’s rulemaking in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council:  
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of 
the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute . . .  
 
“The power of an administrative agency to 
administer a congressionally created . . . program 
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and 
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly 
or explicitly, by Congress.” If Congress has 
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency 
 
 104.  Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Cross-Motion for Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s 
Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176 
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01870-JDB) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment]. 
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to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than 
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute 
its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency. 
 
We have long recognized that considerable 
weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme 
it is entrusted to administer . . . .105 
 
Arguing that the rule was in the taxpayers’ best interests 
because they bear the burden of defaults on student loans for 
ineffective educational programs, the defendants asserted that 
when the administrative agency’s enabling legislation is “silent 
or ambiguous on the precise question at issue,” as was the case 
here, the court “must uphold the agency’s construction of the 
statute it administers so long as it is reasonable.”106 
Additionally, the defendant argued the rule was not arbitrary or 
capricious under the APA because the Department “discussed 
at length the connection between debt and earnings, and 
students’ ability to repay their loans” and because “there is an 
inherently rational connection between the quality of education 
and training a program provides and the type of jobs its 
students are able to obtain.”107 Therefore, defendants noted, the 
 
 105.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
 106.  Def.s’ Cross-Motion for Summ. J. at 8, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. 
Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D.D.C. 2015) (No.14-1870). 
 107.  Id. 
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reasonable nature of the rule entitles the Department to 
deference under Chevron.108 
The district court first analyzed the parties’ respective 
arguments by addressing whether the Higher Education Act’s 
phrase “‘prepare students for gainful employment in a 
recognized occupation’ [has] a plain meaning that the 
Department (and the Court) must simply implement? Or is this 
language ambiguous such that the Court should accept the 
Department’s interpretation—assuming, of course, that its 
interpretation is a reasonable one?”109 In its discussion of the 
rule and previous case law, the court found that Congress’s 
language was ambiguous and the Department could reasonably 
interpret the provision in its promulgation of rules, which it 
did.110 The court next rejected APSCU’s arguments that the 
rule was arbitrary and capricious111:  
[T]ry as it might, the Association has not shown 
that the Department unreasonably interpreted an 
ambiguous statutory command, nor has it proven 
(despite at least a baker’s-dozen arguments) that 
the debt-to-earnings portion of the Department’s 
final “gainful employment” rule is arbitrary or 
capricious or otherwise in violation of the APA.112 
 
In the apt words of Judge John Bates: “And that, as they 
say, is that. The Department’s ‘gainful employment’ 
regulations—including the current debt-to-earnings test and 
disclosure, reporting, and certification requirements—survive 
 
 108.  Def.s’ Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., supra note 103, at 19. See generally Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842–44. 
 109.  Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 184 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
 110.  See id. at 184–92. 
 111.  Id. at 191. 
 112.  Id. at 198. 
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this court challenge in their entirety . . . .”113 The government’s 
motion for summary judgment was thus granted.114 
 
V. NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM 
 
A. Federal Executive Reform 
 
Towards the end of his administration, President 
Obama took significant action to curtail the abuse of American 
veterans and the federal purse by the for-profit education 
industry, but on January 20, 2017, Donald J. Trump became 
the President of the United States.115 President Trump has 
criticized President Obama’s use of executive orders to 
overcome gridlock in Congress,116 but has also indicated that he 
plans to use executive orders to do the same.117 Because he 
claims to be a strong supporter of veterans,118 he may, under 
that rationale, leave the Obama administration’s executive 
orders regarding veterans issues alone. However, Secretary of 
Education Betsy DeVos indicated in her confirmation hearing 
that she may not continue the enforcement of federal 
regulations enacted by the Obama administration for FPIs.119 In 
July 2017, the Department of Education announced that it 
 
 113.  Id. at 204. 
 114.  Order at 1, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176 
(2015) (No. 14-1870). (D.D.C. June 23, 2015). 
 115.  Presidential Inauguration 2017, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/inauguration-2017 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 116.  Timothy Noah & Cogan Schneier, Trump Poised to Erase Obama Policies, 
POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:14 AM). http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-erase-
obama-policies-231156. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Avoiding Gridlock Through 
Unilateral Executive Action: The Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, 7 WAKE FOREST 
J.L. & POL’Y 141 (2017). 
 117.  Bradford Richardson, Trump: Obama ‘Led the Way’ on Executive Orders, THE 
HILL (Jan. 10, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/265371-trump-
obama-led-the-way-on-executive-orders. 
 118.  See Veterans Affairs Reform, TRUMP PENCE MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 2016, 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/ policies/veterans-affairs-reform (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 119.  David Halperin, DeVos Declines to Support For-Profit College Accountability 
Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 17, 2017 8:24 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin/devos-declines-to-support_b_14235348.html. 
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would suspend the federal student loan debt forgiveness 
program for students cheated by FPIs and the Obama 
administration’s gainful employment mandate.120 Secretary 
DeVos has also been criticized for her close connections to the 
for-profit education industry, which some believe will lead to 
further deregulation of FPIs over the next three years.121 
In addition to the Department of Education’s support of 
FPIs, in September 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
proposed a suspension of a fifty-year-old conflict-of-interest 
law that prohibits its employees from having a financial interest 
in FPIs.122 The law requires the dismissal of any Department of 
Veterans Affairs employee who during their employment 
“owned any interest in, or received any wages, salary, dividends, 
profits, gratuities, or services from, any educational institution 
operated for profit in which an eligible person or veteran was 
pursuing a program of education or course.”123 However, the 
agency contends “that statute has illogical and unintended 
consequences, in that it requires the removal of any V.A. 
employee who has any connection to” an FPI.124 Opponents of 
the regulation, including veterans’ groups and ethics experts, 
disagree with the agency’s position, asserting that “‘no good . . . 
 
 120.  Stacy Cowley & Patricia Cohen, Trump Administration Delays Rules on Abuses by 
For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2017, at B8; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, 
DeVos Rejects Invitation to Meet with Former For-Profit College Students, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/28/devos-
rejects-invitation-to-meet-with-former-for-profit-college-students/?utm_term=.d86235c21efa. 
 121.  See id.; John Bowden, Warren Accuses DeVos of Helping For-Profit Colleges 
‘Swindle’ Students, The Hill (June 15, 2017, 6:48 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administr
ation/338056-warren-accuses-devos-of-helping-for-profit-colleges-swindle-students; Richard 
North Patterson, Too Many For-Profit Colleges Defraud Students and Taxpayers Alike, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 5, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/05/too-many-for-
profit-colleges-defraud-students-and-taxpayers-alike/6jKnrUaLp9Ue1SPcgU4nUL/story.html. 
 122.  Employees Whose Association with For-Profit Educational Institutions Poses No 
Detriment to Veterans, 82 Fed. Reg. 43, 288 (Sept. 14, 2017). 
 123.  38 U.S.C. § 3683 (2012). 
 124.  Employees Whose Association with For-Profit Educational Institutions Poses No 
Detriment to Veterans, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43, 288. 
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can come from allowing colleges to have unseemly financial 
entanglements with V.A. employees.’”125 
Still, President Trump also has a controversial history of 
involvement in the for-profit education industry. Trump 
University, a company founded by Trump, was an FPI that 
offered “courses in real estate, asset management, 
entrepreneurship and wealth creation.”126 According to a class 
action complaint filed against Trump University in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California in 
2010 by former students, “Trump University lure[d] consumers 
in with a free introductory Seminar, which turn[ed] out to be 
nothing more than an infomercial used to ‘up-sell’ and 
persuade students to purchase its $1,495 ‘one year 
apprenticeship’ course.”127 The action was brought by plaintiffs 
under the California Unfair Competition Law,128 Consumer 
Legal Remedies Act,129 and False Advertising Law.130 They 
claimed breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, money had and received, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, and false promises.131 The plaintiffs 
sought relief in the form of “refunding Plaintiff and class 
members the full amount paid for Trump University Seminars; 
an order enjoining Trump from falsely marketing and 
advertising its Seminars;” and costs and attorneys’ fees.132 The 
lawsuit was eventually settled for $25 million in November 
2016, less than two weeks after the general election.133 
 
 125.  Patricia Cohen, Veterans Agency Seeks to Scrap Ethics Law on For-Profit Colleges, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/business/veterans-affairs-
ethics.html. 
 126.  Class Action Compl. at 4; Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00940-GPC-
WVG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010). 
 127.  Id. at 4. 
 128.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2016). 
 129.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (Deering 2016). 
 130.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. Code § 17500 (Deering 2016). 
 131.  Class Action Compl., supra note 126, at 2. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Steve Eder, Trump Settles University Suit for $25 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2016, at A1. 
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The President’s history in the industry is not to say, 
however, that he will hinder the work done by the Obama 
administration to curb the predatory practices of FPIs as they 
involve veterans. Rather, it emphasizes the pervasiveness of the 
industry. In addition to maintaining and enforcing the 
Principles of Excellence,134 the executive branch can further 
promulgate rules regarding access by FPIs to military 
installations and federal veterans’ centers, educate veterans and 
service members on the risks these institutions pose, and bolster 
the enforcement of Department of Education regulations. 
However, any substantial change will require congressional 
intervention.135 
 
B. Legislative Reform 
 
One approach to fixing the problems associated with the 
90/10 Rule is for federal veteran education funding to be 
included in the ninety percent allocation with other federal 
funds. In June of 2015, Senator Thomas Carper of Delaware 
introduced the Military and Veterans Education Protection 
Act—a bill that precisely addresses the issue.136 The bill was 
referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions that month, where it remains today.137 An 
identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Jackie Speier of California in November 2015 
and now awaits passage in three committees, most recently 
being referred to the Subcommittee on Higher Education and 
 
 134.  See supra Part IV, Section B. 
 135.  See generally Patton, supra note 71, at 446–49. 
 136.  Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, S. 1664, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2015) (“A Bill [t]o count revenues from military and veteran education programs toward the 
limit on Federal revenues that certain proprietary institutions of higher education are allowed 
to receive for purposes of section 487 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and for other 
purposes.”). 
 137.  S.1664 – Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1664 (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). 
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Workforce Training of the House Committee on Education 
and the Workforce on March 23, 2016.138 This is not the first 
time Senator Carper and Representative Speier have attempted 
to pass this legislation,139 and yet infamous congressional 
gridlock prevails.140 Further, other members of Congress have 
introduced similar legislation with predictably similar results.141 
In September 2016, another attempt was made to 
improve the federal government’s education assistance 
programs for veterans.142 Representative Mark Tanko of 
California introduced the Supporting, Employing, and 
Recognizing Veterans in Communities Everywhere Act 
(“SERVICE Act”), an expansive piece of legislation that, among 
other components, includes provisions to increase oversight of 
disingenuous educational institutions and improve accounta-
bility of federal dollars spent on education benefits for 
veterans.143 For example, if enacted, the bill directs the 
Inspector General of the Department of Veterans Affairs to 
“apply heightened scrutiny” to any institution that has been 
found to have used deceptive practices by any state or federal 
agency and to provide notice to any students enrolled at that 
institution who receive federal assistance of such scrutiny.144 If, 
after the heightened scrutiny is applied, the Secretary of the 
Department finds that the institution has engaged in deceptive 
practices, the institution will be formally disapproved by the 
Department.145 These provisions, in addition to striking the 
 
 138.  H.R.3988 – Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3988/all-actions (last visited Dec. 12, 
2016); see also Military and Veterans Education Protection Act, H.R. 3988, 114th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2015). 
 139.  See Patton, supra note 71, at 448. 
 140.  See generally McGarity, supra note 116. 
 141.  Ensuring Quality Education for Veterans Act, H.R. 4054, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2015). 
 142. See Supporting, Employing, and Recognizing Veterans in Communities Everywhere 
Act, H.R. 6062, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. § 301. 
 145.  Id. § 302. 
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veteran-loophole of the 90/10 Rule,146 are precisely the actions 
that need to be taken to protect veterans and taxpayer money. 
The Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans 
Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2016,147 was 
unanimously passed by the House of Representatives on 
December 6, 2016,148 and the Senate on December 10, 2016.149 
The omnibus bill contains numerous veterans-related 
provisions and addresses some issues surrounding educational 
assistance programs.150 One such provision requires educational 
institutions to provide annual progress reports of students from 
whom they receive funds under the Post-9/11 GI Bill to the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.151 Concerning FPIs, the bill 
transfers the approving authority of education programs not 
subject to approval by the federal government to state 
agencies.152 Non-accredited programs must meet certain state-
mandated criteria in order to be approved by the federal 
government unless the Secretary of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs deems it necessary to expand such criteria in 
particular situations.153 
Overall, the bill’s posture towards FPIs is almost 
friendly. In fact, the bill adds language to Title 38 requiring the 
Secretary, in administering heightened requirements for non-
accredited programs, to “treat public, private, and proprietary 
for-profit educational institutions equitably.”154 Also, notably 
absent from this legislation is any mention of the 90/10 Rule, 
 
 146.  See id. § 305. 
 147.  Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits 
Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-315, 130 Stat. 1536. 
 148.  H.R.6416 - Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits 
Improvement Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/6416/all-actions?overview=closed#tabs (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits 
Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-315, 130 Stat. 1536. 
 151.  Id. § 404. 
 152.  Id. § 408. 
 153.  Id. § 410. 
 154.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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institutional abuses targeted at veterans, or any of the issues 
raised by President Obama in the Principles of Excellence 
program.155 The bill was signed into law by President Obama at 
the end of his term. Senator Johnny Isakson, Chairman of the 
Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, called the legislation “a 
down payment on  . . . the debt that we owe to [our] 
veterans.”156 
Most recently, President Trump signed into law the 
Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 
2017, which expands educational benefits for veterans and assist 
those veterans who fell victim to the predatory practices of ITT 
Technical Institute and Corinthian Colleges.157 While the 
legislation, enacted on August 16, 2017, undoes some of the 
deregulation of the industry by the Trump administration’s 
Department of Education, it fails to protect future predation.158 
With the for-profit education industry generating millions of 
dollars in revenue from veterans assistance programs, and in 
turn spending that money on lobbyists and campaign 
contributions to influence congressional leaders like the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce,159 the 90/10 Rule may continue to leave veterans 
vulnerable to the industry’s corporate greed. 
 
 155.  See Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits 
Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-315, 130 Stat. 1536 
 156.  Leo Shane III, Congress Passes Slimmed-Down Veterans Reform Bill, MIL. TIMES 
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/va-omnibus-passes-without-major-
provisions. 
 157.  Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017, H.R. 3218 (1st 
Sess. 2017); Alexa Liautaud & Christina Sterbenz, Trump’s “Forever GI Bill” Won’t Stop For-
Profit Schools from Preying on Vets, VICE NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://news.vice.com/story/trumps-forever-gi-bill-wont-stop-for-profit-schools-from-preying-
on-vets; Katie Lobosco, Congress Expands GI Bill, Helping Veterans Burned by For-Profit 
Schools, CNN (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/03/pf/college/gi-bill-
benefits-for-profit/index.html. 
 158.  Liautaud & Sterbenz, supra note 155. 
 159.  In 2014, Representative John Kline, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, received $194,099 from the for-profit education industry, over 
$100,000 to the 
next highest recipient. ForProfit Education, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/i
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